Recent studies of socially monogamous species have shown that in many cases females do not copulate exclusively with their pair mates, but are also receptive to other males. The explanation usually given for unfaithful female behaviour is that most females are unable to bond with a male they would prefer as genetic father to their o¡spring. To secure male assistance the female therefore pairs with an available male but also copulates with males of supposedly higher genetic quality. Here we o¡er an alternative evolutionary explanation for female in¢delity, which does not rely upon this`Good Genes' hypothesis of female choice. We show with a simple model that in an evolutionary game between three players, a male, a female and a male lover, solutions exist in which the female can secure more assistance from her mate by being receptive to other males. We conclude that female sexuality can have a decisive role in regulating social behaviour, in which the fertile female is the driving force.
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, monogamy has been looked upon as a male and a female living faithfully together, copulating only with one another. However, molecular methods for analysing paternity together with careful behavioural studies of a number of monogamous species have changed this view. Both females and males seek extra-pair copulations and, as a consequence, o¡spring may have di¡erent social and genetic fathers (Smith 1988; Gowaty & Bridges 1991; Wagner 1992; Birkhead & MÖller 1992) . The frequency of extra-pair paternity can be surprisingly high with ¢gures above 20% not unusual (Birkhead & MÖller 1992) . Consequently many cases of monogamy are today looked upon as a reproductive coalition (social monogamy) in which males and females tend their common o¡spring rather than as sexual monogamy (see Gowaty 1996) .
Proposed hypotheses explaining female in¢delity include the idea that copulating with several males safeguards against males being sterile (Birkhead & MÖller 1992) , and that sexual relationships may give direct bene¢ts in return to the female (Davies 1992; Gray 1997) . However, the only idea that appears to have widespread support is the`Good Genes' hypothesis (Trivers 1972; Birkhead & MÖller 1992) in which monogamous females are trying to get the best of two worlds: attain good genes for their o¡spring as well as male assistance. The Good Genes hypothesis assumes that females can assess the genetic quality of males, and that there is heritable genetic variation in quality among males. The latter assumption has mixed theoretical support and is much debated (Williams 1992; Andersson 1994 ).
An alternative explanation for female in¢delity may be found in the games played between the sexes (Lumpkin 1983) . As has been shown in birds, mammals and insects, male presence during the fertile period can bene¢t the female in several ways, such as protection and defence of resources (Clutton-Brock 1991) . However, males may pay less attention to their mates if instead they can use that time to reproduce with other females (i.e. pursuing extrapair copulations or bonding with a second female).
In this paper we suggest that female strategies can counteract male in¢delity and propose that females accomplish this by producing cues which elicit more attention from their mates. If a female is sexually interested in (i.e. receptive to) other males and thereby attracts them, her pair mate may decide not to stray (see ¢gure 1). This could lead to an increase in male assistance to the female during the fertile period. For instance, a male may contribute to the female's food intake, provide protection against predators and prevent harassment from other males (Ashcroft 1976; Lumpkin 1983 ). In addition, males who remain with their pair mate will ¢nd it more di¤cult to bond with a second female (Maynard Smith 1982) . Consequently, males should evolve sensitivity to cues indicating their risk of being cuckolded, and females should try to produce these cues. To investigate the logic of these arguments we formulate a simple evolutionary game involving three players: the female, her pair mate, and her lover.
MODEL
Assume that a male and a female live together. The female is in reproductive condition with probability p and the cost to the female of being receptive is c. When the pair is reproducing the male's assistance increases the success of their joint breeding. The reproductive output is V u if the male provides full assistance and only V if the assistance is partial. We assume that a potential lover exists with a probability of q. If the lover stays, the male can expect to lose d paternity to the lover if he shows the female full attention and e if the attention is only partial (e4d). A lover that decides to leave the pair receives payo¡ y. A lover that decides to continue courting the female we refer to as being present.
A female strategy de¢nes when to be receptive and towards whom depending upon her reproductive condition. A male strategy de¢nes whether to stray or not, and is potentially in£uenced by the presence or absence of a lover. A lover strategy de¢nes whether to continue courting the female or leave, and this is potentially in£u-enced by the female's behaviour. Our game theory analysis considers all these possibilities as alternative strategies.
The Me¨nage a© Trois solution we consider is a strategy triplet consisting of a`Sexy Female', a`Cautious Male' and an`Opportunistic Lover'. The Sexy Female is receptive towards both the male and the lover during her fertile period and ignores them otherwise. The Cautious Male guards and assists the female if a lover is present; otherwise he spends time away from his mate who thereby receives little or partial assistance. The Opportunistic Lover courts a receptive female but quits if the female ignores him. Thus, the presence of a lover is to a certain extent under female control since the lover will only remain if the female is receptive.
To evaluate whether the triplet making up the Me¨nage a© Trois solution can be evolutionarily stable we consider all alternative strategies. The strategy sets are discrete and we use Maynard Smith's original de¢nition of evolutionary stability (Maynard Smith 1982) . Thus, the triplet is evolutionarily stable if each strategy is a unique best reply towards the other strategies in the triplet (unique best replies may not be necessary for stability but these limiting cases are not important here). Figure 2 gives the pay-o¡s for the alternative strategies available to the di¡erent players (see above) when playing against the other two strategies of the Me¨nage a© Trois triplet. For instance, payo¡s to the various female strategies are the pay-o¡s against the Cautious Male and Opportunistic Lover. The pay-o¡ to the Sexy Female is a¡ected by the male assistance and a cost of receptivity. The male's pay-o¡ is a¡ected by his assistance to the female, the potential loss of paternity and the ¢tness obtained by spending time away from the female. The lover's pay-o¡s depend on the female and on some alternative activity.
By focusing exclusively on evaluating the stability of the Me¨nage a© Trois solution we could limit the game to the three players. In reality though, the game is not played just within a trio since the pay-o¡ to certain options depends on what other players in the whole population are doing. For instance, the pay-o¡ to males for leaving the female will depend upon the strategies used by other females in the population. We interpret the values of parameters a¡ected in this way as those that would occur if the Me¨nage a© Trois strategy were played by most members of the population.
The conditions for the triplet to be evolutionarily stable are as follows. For the female the sexy strategy is a unique best reply to Cautious Male and Opportunistic Lover if there are bene¢ts of male assistance (u40), there is some cost to the female of being sexually active (c40) and 05p51. Cautious Male is a unique best reply to Sexy Female and Opportunistic Lover if the following is true. First, that a potential lover sometimes but not always exists (05q51). It is also required that the increased loss of paternity is greater than the net bene¢t from spending time away from the female when a lover is present ((w À u)5(e À d)). In addition, it is required that w4u for there to be an incentive for males to stray. From these conditions it follows that e4d and e40, that is a philandering male loses paternity. Otherwise the £irtatious behaviour of the female would, in game theory language, be an empty threat and the triplet would not be stable. Opportunistic Lover is a unique best reply to Sexy Female and Cautious Male if the gain from courting a female receptive to a lover is greater than the gain from quitting (d4y). Thus it is also required that d40, i.e. a faithful male who guards his mate must also lose some paternity. In conclusion, this game has under rather broad conditions the Me¨nage a© Trois as an evolutionarily stable solution.
It is important to recognize that a Me¨nage a© Trois solution depends on conditional strategies. In a game theory model certain complexity is needed for conditional behaviour to occur because non-strategic variation has to be introduced. In reality, of course, non-strategic variability is common. In the model described here the risk of cuckoldry varies and the lovers experience di¡erent reproductive success with di¡erent females. This variation was 610 M. Enquist and others The logic of Me¨nage a© Trois Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B (1998) Figure 1 . The logic of Me¨nage a© Trois. The ¢gure compares two possible female strategies in social monogamy. In the ¢rst case (left), the female is faithful whereas in the second case (right), representing Me¨nage a© Trois, females are also receptive to other males. The male has two options. He can either remain faithful to his pair mate by giving her full attention, or he can spend time away from her courting other females (partial attention). In the ¢rst case the cost to the male of only giving partial attention is small, whereas in the Me¨nage a© Trois case the cost may be considerable (by loss of paternity) if he does not give the female full attention. By being receptive to another male (the Me¨nage a© Trois solution), the female may be able to manipulate her pair mate into giving her his full attention. Thus in the Me¨nage a© Trois case there is more of a power balance between the male and the female.
coarsely generated by including a probability of there being a potential lover (i.e. 05q51) and a probability of the female being in reproductive condition (i.e. 05p51). To see that this variability is important, consider for instance the case in which a potential lover always exists (q 1). In such a situation it is best for the male to always stay with a fertile female (or to always stray) and there is no`need' for conditional behaviour in this respect. If males always fully assist their mates, then the advantage to the female of being £irtatious vanishes and might even become a disadvantage if there are associated costs. This in turn has consequences for the lover. The classic`battle between the sexes' (Dawkins 1976) , which studies the same problem as the Me¨nage a© Trois game, does not consider the possibility of conditional strategies. Consequently, the female strategy able to counteract philandering (called Coy) in`battle between the sexes' is not evolutionarily stable (Dawkins 1976; Schuster & Sigmund 1981) . By allowing for more biological realism, such as conditional strategies and non-strategic variability, stable and biologically more plausible solutions are possible (e.g. Enquist & Leimar 1993) .
The strategies in the model can be elaborated by taking into account additional information that is likely to be available to individuals in reality. Female sexual behaviour may be more £exible in responding to the risk of losing male assistance. Alternatively, if the female is fully attended by her mate it may be more bene¢cial for her to resist courtship attempts by other males. In¢delity also has potential costs in terms of reactions from the mate. Males may adjust the degree to which they assist the female according to their opportunities for obtaining extra-pair copulations.
DISCUSSION
The Me¨nage a© Trois solution described above generates a number of predictions that are consistent with empirical observations. Females do direct their sexual interest to more than just their pair mate, by either approaching and displaying to other males or responding to their courtship (Richardson 1987; Bartlett 1988; Birkhead & MÖller 1992; Cubicciotti & Mason 1978; Palombit 1994) . The female may even solicit copulations from other males in the presence of the pair mate (Gubernick & Nordby 1993; Birkhead & Hoi 1994) . If one cue to the pair male is the interest other males show towards his mate, then our model could also explain why females of monogamous species sometimes are highly ornamented, because this could help them attract more attention from other males. It is also predicted from the Me¨nage a© Trois solution that males should be sensitive to varying risks of cuckoldry. There is plenty of evidence that males guard females against other males and may spend days in close proximity to their mate when she is fertile compared with when she is not (Ashcroft 1976; Birkhead & MÖller 1992) . However, whether the presence of other males in£uences male behaviour has seldom been studied. In dunnocks, Prunella modularis, dominant males guard females more carefully when their female mates solicit copulations from subordinate males (Davies 1992) .
It is crucial for the Me¨nage a© Trois solution that lovers, at least on average, are rewarded. Empirical data from di¡erent groups of animals show that females are fertilized by males other than their pair mate (Bartlett 1988; Mu« ller & Eggert 1989; Birkhead & MÖller 1992 ). In the model there is only one lover, but in reality several males may be involved.
The Me¨nage a© Trois hypothesis and the Good Genes hypothesis generate similar predictions and may be di¤-cult to separate based on the empirical data available. They both predict that a female should be receptive to other males and that extra-pair paternity should exist. The two hypotheses di¡er, however, in how females are predicted to behave and about the consequences to males of straying. A female playing a Me¨nage a© Trois game is not expected to express any strong preferences towards particular extra-pair males, unlike females searching for good genes, who would be expected to prefer particular males and to have evolved accurate paternity control. Empirical data on paternity do not reveal the existence of accurate mechanisms for paternity control in monogamous species. For instance, most o¡spring are fathered by the pair-male even when he is of supposedly low genetic quality (Birkhead & MÖller 1992) . In addition, the extreme variation in the frequency of extra-pair copulations and extrapair paternity among species is di¤cult to explain from a good genes perspective. There are also empirical observations that favour the Good Genes hypothesis and which are di¤cult to explain by a Me¨nage a© Trois game. Most obvious, preferences for particular extra-pair males do exist. For instance, there are ¢eld studies showing that males of a speci¢c phenotype have more extra-pair paternity than other males, because females prefer to mate with these males and not due to male^male competition (Kempenaers et al. 1992; Hasselquist et al. 1996) . Other ¢eld studies are, however, less conclusive (Westneat 1993; Dunn et al. 1994; Ra« tti et al. 1995) .
The Me¨nage a© Trois hypothesis also predicts that any male neglecting his mate should su¡er loss of paternity. In contrast, the`Good Genes' hypothesis suggests that males that are successful in obtaining extra-pair paternity should be of high genetic quality and should thus not su¡er from cuckoldry themselves as their female mates should have nothing to gain by copulating with other males. In pied £ycatchers, Ficedula hypoleuca, Bru« n et al. (1996) have shown that polygynous males do su¡er significantly more from extra-pair paternity than monogamous males. In starlings, Sturnus vulgaris, females become sexually more active when their mates court another female (Eens & Pinxten 1996) . In addition, Hoi (1997) found that in the bearded tit, Panurus biarmicus, females paired to high-ranking males had a higher extra-pair solicitation frequency than those paired to low-ranking males. In socially monogamous burying beetles (Silphidae), a system exists that in practice punishes male negligence. Usually the female has been inseminated before establishing a pair bond with a male. However, Mu« ller & Eggert (1989) have shown that the pair male is able to fertilize most eggs if he remains faithfully with his mate. If the male leaves the female will use the stored sperm for fertilization from another male or males. Not all data, however, point in the direction predicted by the Me¨nage a© Trois game. At least two studies show that males that are successful in obtaining extra pair copulations (due to female choice) su¡er less from extra-pair paternity themselves (Kempenaers et al. 1992; Hasselquist et al. 1996) , thus supporting the Good Genes hypothesis. Studies of yellow warblers, Dendroica petechia, and house sparrows, Passer domesticus, show inconclusive results. Males who were successful in achieving extra-pair copulations were just as likely to lose paternity with their social mate as other males in the population as a whole (Yezerinac et al. 1995; Wetton et al. 1995) .
In conclusion, empirical data provide a somewhat unclear picture regarding the support for the two hypotheses. We regard, however, the Me¨nage a© Trois hypothesis as a serious alternative to the Good Genes hypothesis. Alexander & Noonan (1979) and Lumpkin (1983) have discussed sexual behaviour as being a means for females to maintain social control. Our model shows that female sexuality can play a decisive role in regulating social behaviour, with the fertile female being the driving force. A question that is of considerable interest in the light of this conclusion, but not studied here, is whether truly faithful monogamy is ever evolutionarily stable.
